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If the discipline of ethics can have its
'metaethics', then the discipline of bioethics
can have its 'metabioethics'. This book would
be a notable contribution to such a discipline.
Based on a symposium held at the University
of Central Lancashire in Preston, England, this
collection presents an insightful set of
readings which question a range of
assumptions and methods in contemporary
bioethics.
The first of these assumptions is that
bioethics is an instance of applied ethics in
which philosophers are the appropriate
experts. In essays by Rebecca Bennett and
Alan Cribb and by Mairi Levitt the
pre-eminence of philosophy is challenged with
allegations that philosophers do not listen to
the voices of clinicians, patients, and lay
people, and are insufficiently critical of the
social construction of many bioethical issues
and medical facts. Given these charges and
the appeal for a greater role for the human
sciences that they support, it is striking that
the bulk of the thirteen essays in the book are
by philosophers and clearly exemplify
philosophical methodologies. While it is
doubtless true that there is a lot of interesting
research that might be done around the social
circumstances of the problems with which
bioethics concerns itself, the authors of these
opening essays need to ask what the goals of
bioethics are. The most obvious of such goals
would be to assist in the formulation of public
policy and law in relation to ethically sensitive
issues within health care practices and in
relation to technological possibilities raised by
advances in medical science, and also to
assist individuals in making conscientious
decisions about such matters in clinical
contexts. Insofar as these goals are action
guiding, it is clear that moral philosophy does
indeed have a central role to play. There is no
doubt that philosophers should be apprised of
all relevant facts and should draw upon
relevant research, but it is not clear why such
research should be called 'bioethical' if it is
not engaged in within the context of these
kinds of goals. Bioethics should certainly be multidisciplinary, but it is centrally normative and
hence dependent upon the methods and theories of moral philosophy.
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But these theories and methods are themselves highly discussable. Should we accept
philosophy's focus on reason at the expense of appropriate emotion? Tuija Takala argues that
'sense and sensibility' should both be taken into account. Some utilitarian arguments illustrate
how pure reason can be oblivious of the sensibilities of people affected by their prescriptions.
Nevertheless, feelings by themselves cannot guide ethics because they are contingent and
equivocal. This essay ends with the programmatic suggestion that morality should be
'minimal' so as not to make claims that cannot be widely accepted in a pluralistic society in
which people's sensibilities on bioethical issues differ so greatly.
The standard response of philosophy to such a variety of convictions is to move the
discussion to the higher level of moral theory so that appeal can be made to universal norms.
This in turn has been challenged by those bioethicists who stress the particular and social
character of bioethical decision making. These critics suggest that consequentialism,
deontology, and other moral theories are insufficiently action-guiding and are often not
incompatible in what they concretely prescribe. However, Eve Garrard and Stephen Wilkinson
insist that moral theory does make a difference. Whether one stresses values in outcomes or
adherence to duty does alter one's perspective, and whether one thinks that morality has a
transcendent standing or is merely an instrument for social harmony relative to the values of a
given community will also alter the way that one does bioethics. Bioethicists carry hidden
theoretical assumptions which enter into their disagreements and intuitions at a number of
levels. There can be no reflective equilibrium within one's own intuitions or between the
convictions of disputing parties unless those assumptions are explicated and debated.
Søren Holm then turns the book's attention to a logical structure that bioethical
debates often evince: namely that of 'parity of reasoning' arguments. Such arguments involve
seeing what a person agrees with in one context, arguing that a different situation is
relevantly similar, and then concluding that that person should be committed to a given policy
in the new context. An example is James Rachels' well known consequentialist argument that,
in the context of the drowning cousin in the bathtub, there is no moral difference between
killing and letting die. One is meant to conclude that there would be no such moral difference
in the case of euthanasia either. The problem with such arguments, it is suggested, is that
there can be salient differences between the contexts. Everyone has to interpret the situation,
and various interpretations, especially with reference to the intentions of the agent, can be
given. There must be a reasonable point at which one can refuse to see that parity applies in
the reasoning. But the irony of this argument, which follows the essay that espouses the
relevance of theory, is that it effectively refutes general moral reasoning in favour of
'particularism'. If the application of a conclusion from one case to another requires careful
interpretation of the new situation, it would seem that general considerations lack weight.
What does have weight is careful and sensitive interpretation of particular circumstances. If
every situation is unique then not only 'parity of reasoning' arguments, but any appeal to
general principles or moral theories might be otiose.
In order to defend the role of reason in bioethics, Harry Lesser tackles some criticisms
made by Anne MacLean against 'ethical rationalism'. The most notable of these criticisms is
the Wittgensteinian point that it is not general or universal principles that ground ethical
rightness, but practices. It is practical contexts such as health care practice that ordain what
is right within bioethics while the practices themselves cannot be justified because they rest
on unchallengeable intuitions. If some are better at doing the right things than others, it is
not because they have rational expertise but because they are more serious in their
commitment to the values of the practice and more discerning in pursuing them. This is
clearly a very important and challenging claim and one that a brief essay cannot do justice to.
But Lesser does not help his case by adopting a rather naïve position. He accuses MacLean of
relativism and puts the familiar point that relativism leaves a culture or a practice without any
sources of criticism or reform. But this is a furphy. A practice is not monolithic. People of
virtue can discern problems with unethical but widely accepted practices, even if they are
participants in those practices. It is arguable that this process does not require appeal to
general norms or rights, but sensitivity to the values inherent in the practice itself. Lesser is
right to say that practices must be open to question, but the issue is whether this is done with
reference to external principles or to internal values. Lesser concludes his essay by suggesting
that reason should not be supreme and nor should feeling and practice-relative intuition.
Rather there should be reflective equilibrium. One's (socially relative) intuitions should be
honed by rational reflection. But this, I would argue, is consistent with the sophisticated form
of relativism that MacLean espouses.
One of the charms of a collection of essays like this book is that one can often discern
possibly unintended differences in opinion between the authors. For example, in a closely
argued essay which examines Beauchamp and Childress' widely taught form of 'principlism',
Peter Herissone-Kelly could be seen as disagreeing with Lesser and, perhaps, Garrard and
Wilkinson. He argues that the notion of the 'global applicability' of a universal common core of
morality which Beauchamp and Childress appeal to is not sustainable. Rather he suggests that
the norms which are necessary to any morality have a number of differing possible
'specifications' depending on context and that bioethics may present differing contexts in
 Subscribe in a reader
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different countries. For example, Beauchamp and Childress' own specifications of their
principles might be somewhat American. Herissone-Kelly also rejects the 'transcendental
argument' for such a common morality which says that we cannot criticise aberrant cultures
unless we have trans-cultural norms. As a result, argues Herissone-Kelly, principlism fails both
as an empirical and as a conceptual theory about how a 'common morality' applies to
bioethics.
Charles A. Erin is also concerned with Beauchamp and Childress' four principles and,
in particular, with Raanan Gillon's espousal of them. While making clear that their proponents
do not see these principles as a decision procedure or as a moral theory, Erin is concerned that
most medical students and clinicians will use them in just that way. Erin insists that the
'checklist' approach is inadequate and that clinicians should study moral theory in order to
give a deeper ground to their decisions. But a particularist or Wittgensteinian view on this
would be that, while ethical decisions may be hard to make, this is not because they are
theoretically difficult and require the prioritising of principles. It is because they require a
sensitive awareness of what is important for health care practice in the concrete situation.
Matti Häyry also mentions the four principles of Beauchamp and Childress but in the
context of a different issue. He asks whether bioscientists need a professional ethics. Only if
they constitute a profession would they need a professional ethics and he urges them to
become a profession so that they will be free of external regulation. But their choice of a
professional ethic could direct them to the American principles of Beauchamp and Childress or
to European principles which stress human dignity and a precautionary approach which urges
agents to prevent even harmful effects which they cannot foresee. In either case, guidance
would depend on the many interpretations that these principles could be given and, in the
European case, such guidance would rule out virtually all genetic research.
 John Harris' essay operates less at the 'meta' level of the rest of the book than at the
more concrete level of bioethical debate. It is a vigorous attack on the Catholic 'Pro-life'
position as propounded by David Oderberg. Harris contends that this position is actually
anti-life. For example, it allows killing in cases where that killing is an unintended effect of
actions which have a non-malevolent purpose. Moreover, the prohibition against killing often
results in more deaths. So, the refusal to kill one conjoined twin in order to save the other
often results in the death of both. Harris' critique is devastating but his own consequentialist
outlook seems to blind him to the real purpose of the traditional position he is attacking. Why
would someone who propounds the sanctity of life not take these consequences seriously?
Harris does not seem to notice that the Catholic position is not actually a sanctity of life
position: it is a sanctity of conscience position. The important thing is not the outcome of the
action, but the innocence of the intention. A thorough critique of the Catholic position would
have to challenge its other-worldly metaphysics in which outcomes in this world are not as
important as the salvation of the agent's soul.
But, as we have seen, utilitarianism is not the preferred position of many contributors
to the volume. Simo Vehmas is critical of arguments by Peter Singer and Helga Kuhse that
suggest it would be a rational choice to prevent the existence of persons with impairments if
those impairments were sufficiently severe. Vehmas finds that most utilitarian arguments (he
also discusses John Harris, Julian Savulescu, Dena Davis, and others) presuppose a negative
attitude to impairment. It is presupposed that a life of 'normal' ability is rationally preferable.
But this discounts the experience of many impaired people. Down syndrome, for example
need not prevent a happy life. He accuses Singer and Kuhse of inconsistency in their
conception of utilitarianism. Whereas they espouse a Benthamite preference utilitarianism in
which the happiness of individuals is paramount, they actually apply a Millian ideal
utilitarianism in which some lives can be said to be better than others. Moreover, utilitarianism
treats impairment as an individual problem. But it is also a social problem arising from the
prejudices held against impaired people. Rather than focus on individuals and whether they
should exist, there should be a focus on societies and how disability can be reduced for
impaired people. Vehmas urges us to move, in thinking about disability, from thinking about
deviance (negative departures from a 'norm'), or even thinking about difference (neutral
departures from a 'norm'), to human variety (absence of a 'norm'). Only then can the
utilitarian assumption that an impaired life is inherently undesirable or a moral harm to its
owner be overcome.
Mark P. Sheehan's essay addresses the conceptual problems surrounding paternalism,
which he defines as a clinician deciding on what is good for the patient irrespective of what
the patient sees as good. His claim is that the problem is not one of pitting beneficence
against autonomy. Indeed, in critiquing unjustified paternalism, an appeal to the patient's
autonomy is of less theoretical importance than an appeal to promoting the patient's good as
it is seen by the patient. The advantage of this view is that it aligns the clinician's purposes
with the beneficent goals of medicine.
Autonomy and paternalism are also themes in Paul Barrow's concluding contribution.
This essay is a wide ranging reflection on the role of bioethics in an aging society which
focuses on the case of the Jehovah's Witness who (autonomously) refuses a blood transfusion.
Whereas such a patient would have been overruled in times past, today's approach would be
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to regard an unasked-for transfusion as a case of battery. What stand should a clinician take
in such a case? The solution that Barrow hints at is to deepen the notion of autonomy in a
Kantian manner such that it is not just a right or a condition that grounds that right, but a
prerequisite for dutiful and responsible action. In this way the clinician's autonomy is also
relevant and could motivate a responsible refusal to be part of any procedure which would not
be considered medically best for the patient.
This book is an excellent collection of essays which are accessibly written, relatively
short, and highly thought provoking. Clinicians, caring professionals, philosophers, and
students who have some familiarity with the bioethical literature will gain greatly from reading
it. If the maturity of a discipline is evidenced by its willingness to reflect on its own
assumptions and methods, then this book is a mark of such maturity in bioethics.
 
© 2003 Stan van Hooft
 
 
Stan van Hooft teaches philosophy at Deakin University in Australia. He is the
author of Caring: An Essay in the Philosophy of Ethics, Niwot CO, University
Press of Colorado, (1995), and numerous journal articles on ethics,
philosophical psychology, and applied philosophy. He can be contacted at
stanvh@deakin.edu.au
About Us | About CenterSite | Terms & Privacy
Copyright © CenterSite, LLC, 1995-2009
Review - Scratching the Surface of Bioethics - Ethics http://metapsychology.mentalhelp.net/poc/view_doc.php?type=book&i...
4 of 4 6/08/2009 3:25 PM
